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The Dance of Partisanship and Districting
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
Academic studies of redistricting tend to be either doctrinal or empirical, but not both.
As a result, the literature overlooks some of the most important aspects of the mapmaking
process and its judicial supervision, like how they relate to the broader American political
context. In this Article, I try to fill this gap. I first observe that the half-century in which
federal courts have decided redistricting cases can be divided into two periods: one lasting
from the 1960s to the 1980s, in which voters and politicians were both comparatively
nonpartisan; and another reaching from the 1990s to the present day, which amounts to
perhaps the most hyperpartisan era in our country’s history. I then explore how redistricting law has responded to the ebbs and flows of partisanship. In the earlier timeframe,
courts (properly) focused on nonpartisan line-drawing problems like rural overrepresentation and racial discrimination. In the hyperpartisan present, on the other hand, courts
have (regrettably) refrained from confronting directly the threat, partisan gerrymandering,
that now looms above all others. Instead, courts have either shut their eyes to the danger or
sought to curb it indirectly through the redeployment of nonpartisan legal theories.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
THE SECOND ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.
A. Malapportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Race and Redistricting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Partisan Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE HYPERPARTISAN PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Malapportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Race and Redistricting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Dormancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Repackaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Partisan Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

507
512
513
516
519
521
523
525
525
528
530
534

INTRODUCTION
Suppose you live in a relatively nonpartisan period: an era in which
voters and politicians are not highly motivated, or divided, by partisanship.
Suppose also that you are asked to design a district map for some jurisdiction. How would you approach your task? Odds are you would not try to
gerrymander in favor of your preferred party. Partisan advantage would not
top your list of priorities in this nonpartisan age, and gerrymandering could
be futile anyway due to voters’ and politicians’ unstable partisan attachments.
Instead, you might follow traditional redistricting criteria like compactness
and respect for political subdivisions. Or you might aim to protect incum* Austin Wakeman Scott Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of
Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School.
For helpful comments, I thank the workshop participants at the University of Chicago and the
University of Georgia. I am also grateful for the support of the Robert Helman Law and
Public Policy Fund.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252063

508

Harvard Law & Policy Review

[Vol. 13

bents of both parties. Or, more deviously, you might seek to reduce other
groups’ representation by dispersing or highly concentrating their voters.
Not partisan groups, mind you, but rather blocs defined by more salient
cleavages like region, ethnicity, or race.
Now imagine that you are still the designated line-drawer, but that you
live in a hyperpartisan period in which party trumps all other factors for the
electorate and the political elite. In this scenario, you would have a nearly
irresistible incentive to gerrymander. Partisan gain would take precedence
over your other redistricting objectives. Gerrymandering would also be both
feasible (due to voters’ predictable behavior) and consequential (since most
candidates would toe the party line after being elected). In contrast, you
would have little reason to heed traditional criteria, to shield the other party’s
incumbents, or to try to harm regional, ethnic, or racial groups. These goals
would pale compared to the imperative of benefiting your party and handicapping the opposition.
Next, put yourself in the shoes not of a mapmaker but rather of a judge
evaluating a district map. Posit, too, that you are at least somewhat publicminded—aspiring to enforce the Constitution, statutory requirements, and
basic democratic values—and not fully in the thrall of a party or another
political faction. In a less partisan era, you would probably not be very concerned about partisan gerrymandering. You would recognize that it is both
an infrequent act and one that often backfires on its architects. On the other
hand, you might be quite worried about nonpartisan redistricting abuses, like
efforts to underrepresent urban or minority voters. These tactics could be
more common, and more effective, in an age when region, ethnicity, and
race are the key political fault lines.
In a hyperpartisan period, lastly, your judicial agenda would likely be
quite different. Partisan gerrymandering would pose a greater danger, while
nonpartisan redistricting schemes would be less threatening, and it would be
sensible for your case law to reflect this reality. But how would your doctrine
adapt? The most obvious response would be a direct one: the invalidation of
district maps precisely because their motives, or consequences, are overly
partisan. Remember, though, that you are only reasonably public-minded,
not a profile in impartiality or courage. You might therefore shy away from a
direct response because it could require you to rule against your preferred
party or to face intense resistance from legislators desperate to keep their
seats. Instead of frontal confrontation, you might choose to do nothing: to
avoid judicial intervention and to uphold district maps whenever they are
challenged on partisan grounds. Or, somewhat more boldly, you might opt
for an indirect response. In this mode, you would still refrain from striking
down maps because they are partisan gerrymanders, but you would deploy
other legal theories—nonpartisan ones—to check the partisan manipulation
of district lines.
I have a normative perspective about which of these options is best. In
my view, election law should focus on whichever cleavage happens to dominate a given era’s politics. It should vigilantly guard against attempts to ex-
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ploit this cleavage in favor of one group and against other factions. In a
hyperpartisan age, this means election law should be highly sensitive to the
problem of partisan gerrymandering. It also means the field should grapple
openly with gerrymandering, not try to address it obliquely through halfmeasures unlikely to succeed.
But this normative terrain is ground I have previously covered.1 Here, I
want to tackle a related descriptive question: How have courts responded—
not how should they respond—to the ebb and flow of partisanship over
American history, in the redistricting context in particular? Have they largely
ignored partisan gerrymandering in relatively nonpartisan periods (as above I
suggested they might)? What about in hyperpartisan times—what steps have
courts taken then? Have they sought to curb gerrymandering directly, to
fight it by repackaging nonpartisan causes of action, or to retreat entirely
from the field of battle?
Before engaging with this question, it is necessary to know how partisanship has, in fact, waxed and waned in American politics. For present purposes, the relevant era can be taken to start in the early 1960s, when the
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that redistricting disputes are justiciable.2 From that date through the 1980s, voters and politicians were both
startlingly nonpartisan. Many voters split their tickets to back different parties’ candidates, changed their votes from one election to another, and evaluated both major parties favorably. Officeholders too were remarkably fluid in
their partisan and ideological allegiances. They often bucked their parties
and espoused moderate positions, causing congressional polarization to fall
to its modern nadir.
As even a casual observer can attest, this description does not come
close to capturing the present day. To the contrary, from the 1990s onward,
the partisanship of the American political system steadily intensified, and
has now reached unprecedented heights. Voters today are less likely to split
their tickets, more apt to back the same party from year to year, and more
negative in their impressions of the opposing party, than at any point since
the advent of polling. Members of Congress, likewise, are more divided
along party lines than ever before. Not only is there no ideological overlap
between the parties’ respective legislators, but a vast ideological gulf separates
the typical Democratic representative from the typical Republican.
With this background established, we can return to my central inquiry:
the interplay between partisanship and judicial behavior in the redistricting
domain. I claim here that in the comparatively nonpartisan 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s, courts indeed directed their energies at issues other than partisan
1
See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
283 (2014) (arguing that election law should aim for the alignment of policy outcomes with
popular preferences); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015) (contending that this general alignment principle requires judicial action against partisan gerrymandering, using result-oriented
measures like the efficiency gap).
2
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208–37 (1962).
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gerrymandering. They neither intended to combat partisan line-drawing
abuses, nor did their decisions have the effect of advantaging either party.
Consider the one person, one vote rule, announced by the Supreme Court in
the mid-1960s and requiring a jurisdiction’s districts to have approximately
the same population.3 In nearly every state, the malapportionment that
prompted the Court to step in favored rural (not necessarily Democratic or
Republican) areas. So by compelling equally populated districts, the Court
did not expect to benefit either party. But it did anticipate making representation fairer for urban and suburban voters throughout the country.
Or take the Court’s efforts to protect minority voters against schemes
that diluted the impact of their ballots or otherwise reduced their electoral
influence.4 Most of these efforts involved laws enacted in the (still) Solid
South—a region that elected almost no Republicans, at any level, for the
century after the end of Reconstruction. By eliminating practices that undermined African Americans’ political clout, the Court thus exchanged some
white Democratic officeholders for black Democrats. But at least in the
short run, the Court did not give a comparable boost to Republican electoral
fortunes.
In the short run is an important qualifier. Eventually, the rise of black
political power in the South helped to terminate the less partisan Cold War
period, and to bring about the very different age in which we now live. The
causal sequence was as follows: In response to the growing sway of African
Americans, southern white voters began to support Republican candidates in
ever increasing numbers. Over time, this trend resulted in the virtual extinction of moderate white Democratic politicians in the South, and their replacement by conservative white Republicans. This substitution hastened the
sorting of America’s political elites. Democratic officeholders became more
uniformly liberal, and Republicans more consistently conservative. The
country’s voters, in turn, reacted to the sorting of the elites by rearranging
themselves too. Party affiliations and policy views, previously linked only
tenuously, developed a much stronger bond, such that most Democratic voters placed themselves on the left side of the ideological spectrum, and most
Republicans on the right.5
The hyperpartisanship fueled by these trends created a quandary for
redistricting law. How would it respond to voters and politicians who no
longer behaved like their predecessors? I argue here that, for the most part,
the field adapted in two distinctive ways. Certain doctrines went into dormancy, deployed unsuccessfully (or not at all) as the nonpartisan concerns
that originally animated them declined in salience. Certain doctrines—including some of the previously quiescent theories—also evolved into vehicles
for partisan grievances, used to challenge policies motivated by, and resulting
in, partisan advantage.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
5
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 288 (2011).
3
4
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Reconsider one person, one vote. For about twenty years (from the
mid-1980s to the mid-2000s), few plaintiffs sued on the basis of malapportionment, and fewer still prevailed. Districts’ populations were far more
equal in this era, and the variances that remained did not consistently favor
any particular group. Then, in the last decade, the Supreme Court breathed
new life into this cause of action. It became available, for the first time, when
the mapmaking party’s districts are modestly underpopulated and the opposing party’s districts have somewhat more residents than they need.
The same sequence of dormancy followed by partisan revival unfolded
in the racial gerrymandering context. In the 2000s, when such cases were
brought, courts generally concluded that districting decisions were made for
partisan, not racial, reasons. There seemed to be little place for a race-based
theory in a world dominated by party. In the 2010s, though, racial gerrymandering suits made a striking comeback. Over and over, they were used to
invalidate partisan gerrymanders that had been constructed, in part, by packing black Democrats into a small number of districts.
In the face of hyperpartisanship, then, redistricting law either went into
abeyance or sought to curb it indirectly, through doctrines designed to serve
other ends. What courts did not do (with a few notable exceptions) is what I
think they should have done: namely, confront partisan gerrymandering
frontally by invalidating maps because of their partisan purposes or effects.
The Supreme Court, for instance, came close to deeming the cause of action
nonjusticiable in a 2004 case;6 then expressed skepticism that empirical measures could assist its analysis in 2006;7 and in its most recent term, twice
found creative ways to avoid facing the merits of gerrymandering suits.8 At
every turn, the Court resembled the timorous judge I portrayed earlier: concerned about partisan line-drawing abuses—but not so worried as actually to
do something about them.
But I fear I am lapsing into normative judgment again, while my aim
here is to describe (not to criticize) the judicial response first to the relative
nonpartisanship of the Cold War, and then to the hyperpartisanship of the
last generation. Because there are two periods in which I am interested, this
article proceeds in two parts. Each part starts by briefly summarizing the
political science literature about the partisanship and polarization of voters
and officeholders in the relevant timeframe. These discussions are short because other scholars (including legal academics) have already surveyed this
scholarship.9 Each part then delves deeply into the redistricting case law,
examining the doctrines of malapportionment, racial vote dilution, retrogression, racial gerrymandering, and partisan gerrymandering. The first part’s
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
8
See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018).
9
Prominent surveys by law professors include Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (2015); Pildes, supra
note 5; and David Schleicher, Things Aren’t Going That Well Over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433 (2015).
6
7
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contention, again, is that courts in the less partisan 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
neither tried to, nor unintentionally did, address the partisan aspects of redistricting. The second part’s thesis, likewise, is that courts in the hyperpartisan present have embraced the dormancy and repackaging responses to
partisan gerrymandering, but not (so far) the direct response. Lastly, the
conclusion argues that frontal judicial confrontation is more effective than
repackaging because it cannot be circumvented by self-interested legislators.
I. THE SECOND ERA

OF

GOOD FEELINGS

Beginning with the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, I refer to these three decades as the second era of good feelings. The original Era of Good Feelings
unfolded during the presidency of James Monroe, and earned its label due to
its unusually nonpartisan politics.10 The Federalist Party was a spent force by
the second decade of the nineteenth century; in fact, it failed even to run a
presidential candidate in the election of 1820. Monroe also pursued a policy
of “amalgamation” that sought to combine the Federalist Party’s remnants
with the dominant Democratic-Republican Party. In Congress too, polarization reached an all-time low during Monroe’s second term, with little separating the body’s few Federalists from its Democratic-Republican
supermajority.11
What is the evidence that the second era of good feelings resembled the
first? Without purporting to be exhaustive, here are some revealing findings
from political scientists about the period’s subdued partisanship and polarization. More than one-fourth of voters split their tickets in federal elections
in the 1970s and 1980s, compared to less than one-sixth in the more partisan 1950s.12 The correlation between voters’ presidential and congressional
choices therefore fell from roughly 0.8 in the 1950s to about 0.6 in the 1970s
and 1980s.13 Survey respondents also assigned middling—but not awful—
ratings to the opposing party in the 1970s and 1980s: between 45 and 50 on
a scale from 0 (most negative) to 100 (most positive).14 Unsurprisingly, given
these tepid views, only a tiny minority of respondents (around 5%) objected
to inter-party marriage in the 1960s.15 And when asked to report their ideologies on a seven-point scale from very liberal to very conservative, most vot-

For a book-length treatment, see GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEEL(Ivan R. Dee 1989) (1952).
11
See Parties Overview, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/parties/all [https://perma.cc/
EU5G-VT8Z].
12
See, e.g., Kenneth Mulligan, Partisan Ambivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government, 32 POL. PSYCHOL. 505, 513 (2011).
13
See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral
Connection, 30 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 14 (2003).
14
See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar et al., Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 413 (2012).
15
See id. at 417.
10

INGS
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ers in the 1970s and 1980s said they were moderates.16 Voters’ views thus
barely differed based on (and had only a tenuous link to) their party
affiliations.17
With respect to officeholders, similarly, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal have compiled every vote ever taken in Congress.18 They have used
this vast database to estimate legislators’ ideal points (or preferred sets of
policy positions) from the 1st Congress (1789–91) to the 115th (2017–19).19
In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the difference in ideal points between the
median Democratic member of Congress and the median Republican was
lower than at any time since the original Era of Good Feelings.20 There was
also significant ideological overlap between congressional Democrats and
Republicans in this period. Roughly one-fifth of House members—and onethird of senators—were more conservative (in the case of Democrats) or liberal (in Republicans’ case) than at least 10% of their colleagues across the
aisle.21
As voters and politicians achieved this rare state of relative comity, the
Supreme Court suddenly entered the “political thicket” of redistricting: the
domain so dubbed by Justice Frankfurter because of its complexity and proximity to partisan politics.22 Starting in 1962, the Court announced, in short
order, causes of action for malapportionment, racial vote dilution, retrogression, racial gerrymandering, and partisan gerrymandering. I argue below that
all of these doctrines (except, of course, for partisan gerrymandering) tried to
solve nonpartisan problems that loomed large in this era, especially rural
overrepresentation and racial discrimination. More controversially, I contend
that none of the doctrines (including partisan gerrymandering) had significant partisan consequences. As befitted a less partisan age, the Court’s intervention was therefore nonpartisan in both intent and effect.
A. Malapportionment
I begin with the one person, one vote revolution of the 1960s: the series
of landmark decisions in which the Court declared that all electoral dis16
See, e.g., MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME
DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 71–72 (2009).
17
See, e.g., Marc J. Hetherington, Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
413, 437 (2009).
18
See VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/ [https://perma.cc/U5CN-NPEH].
19
See id.
20
See Parties Overview, supra note 11; The Polarization of the Congressional Parties,
VOTEVIEW (Jan. 30, 2016), https://legacy.voteview.com/political_polarization_2015.htm.
[https://perma.cc/8NQY-UY2U]. This period of low polarization actually stretched from the
1930s through the 1980s. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Jan. 30,
2016), https://legacy.voteview.com/political_polarization_2015.htm. [https://perma.cc/
8NQY-UY2U].
21
See Hahrie Han & David W. Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional
Party Polarization After the Second World War, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 505, 510–11 (2007).
22
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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tricts—congressional,23 state legislative,24 and local25—must be approximately equal in population. In these cases, the Court stressed that the
malapportionment that was then rampant across the country was not random, but rather exhibited the same pattern in almost every state: the underpopulation (and overrepresentation) of rural areas, and the
overpopulation (and underrepresentation) of cities and suburbs.26 It was this
persistent rural advantage, more than any partisan aspect of malapportionment, that seemed undemocratic to the Court and that drove its foray into
the thicket.27
Consider Reynolds v. Sims,28 the most prominent of the one person, one
vote cases. Alabama had failed to redraw its state legislative maps for more
than sixty years, resulting in ratios of around 16-to-1 between the largest and
smallest districts in the state house and about 41-to-1 in the state senate.29
These enormous population deviations had no partisan valence, because
Democrats held all 106 state house seats and all 35 state senate seats in the
early 1960s.30 But the deviations massively benefited “rural counties [that
had] incurred sizable losses in population,” while equally handicapping “urban counties” where “[v]irtually all of the population gain [had] occurred.”31
Indeed, the deviations gave rise to a “rural strangle hold [sic]” on the state
legislature, prompting the Court’s remark that “[a] citizen, a qualified voter,
is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm.”32 The
Court continued: “[A]pportionment controversies are generally viewed as involving urban-rural conflicts . . . . [T]he thrust of state legislative malapportionment . . . is underrepresentation of urban and suburban areas.”33
Or take Gray v. Sanders,34 where the Court invalidated Georgia’s
“county unit system” for primary elections for the governorship and other
statewide offices.35 This system allotted units (or votes) to each county based
on its representation in the state house.36 Because the state house was malapportioned in favor of rural counties, the system “weight[ed] the rural vote
more heavily than the urban vote.”37 The system did not, however, advantage
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
25
See Avery v. Midland City, 390 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1968).
26
See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
27
Today’s Court continues to understand its intervention half a century earlier in these
terms. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016) (observing that malapportionment
“left many rural districts significantly underpopulated in comparison with urban and suburban
districts”).
28
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
29
See id. at 545.
30
See Carl Klarner, State Partisan Balance Data, 1937 –2011, HARVARD DATAVERSE
(2013), https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20403 [https://perma.cc/QN39-BUET].
31
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 542 n.7.
32
Id. at 543, 570.
33
Id. at 567 n.43.
34
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
35
Id. at 368.
36
See id. at 371.
37
Id. at 379.
23
24
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either party; no such edge was possible in a one-party state where Democrats
won almost every election.38 Consistent with the system’s regional (rather
than partisan) skew, the Court trained its criticism on rural overrepresentation. “How then can one person be given twice or 10 times the voting power
of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural
area or because he lives in the smallest rural county?”39
Notably, the Court freely admitted that its one person, one vote rule
did not aim to correct partisan distortions. In a 1973 case, the Court faced a
Connecticut plan whose population deviations were small but that was nevertheless alleged to be “nothing less than a gigantic political gerrymander.”40
The Court upheld the map, commenting that it had “not ventured far or
attempted” to “extirpat[e] politics from what are the essentially political
processes of the sovereign States.”41 In a 1983 case, similarly, a dissenting
Justice pointed out that “‘absolute [population] equality is perfectly compatible with “gerrymandering” of the worst sort.’”42 The Court essentially agreed
with the observation, conceding that equal district population “does little to
prevent what is known as gerrymandering” and “is far less ambitious than
what would be required to address gerrymandering on a constitutional
level.”43
Also strikingly, the dissenters in the great one person, one vote cases
shared the majority’s belief that region, not party, was the critical cleavage.
The dissenters diverged from the majority only in their position that rural
advantage was a valid justification for malapportionment. Justice Frankfurter
thus emphasized in Baker v. Carr44 (in the last opinion he would ever write)
that “the pattern of according greater per capita representation to rural, relatively sparsely populated areas” was ubiquitous both in America and
abroad.45 In his view, the pattern’s prevalence confirmed its constitutionality.46 Likewise, Justice Harlan argued in Gray that “a State might rationally
conclude that its general welfare was best served by apportioning more seats
in the legislature to agricultural communities than to urban centers.”47 This
policy would prevent “the legitimate interests of the former” from being
“submerged in the stronger electoral voice of the latter.”48
The Justices’ consensus turns out to have been empirically sound. As
the majority hoped (and the dissenters feared), the one person, one vote
38
For example, Democrats held the Georgia governorship (the most important office
elected using the county unit system) for the entire twentieth century. See Klarner, supra note
30.
39
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
40
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973).
41
Id. at 754.
42
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 776 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Wells v.
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
43
Id. at 734 n.6.
44
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
45
Id. at 320 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46
See id.
47
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 386 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48
Id.
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revolution shattered rural legislative power and vastly increased the sway of
urban and suburban voters. Over less than a decade, thousands of rural districts were dismantled and similar numbers of urban and suburban constituencies were created.49 Rural legislative majorities consequently disappeared in
seventeen states.50 And along with these majorities vanished the governmental largesse that rural areas had previously enjoyed. Counties that were overrepresented in the legislature in 1960 received larger per-capita transfers of
state funds than underrepresented counties—but by 1968, after districts had
been redrawn across the country, this relationship had evaporated.51
As the Justices also expected, this upheaval did not accrue to the benefit
of either party. To the contrary, the average partisan bias of district plans
nationwide was close to zero both before and after the Court’s intervention.52
How could all of the mapmaking activity not have moved the partisan needle? The answer is that it did move it—only in different directions in different regions, which canceled out when aggregated. In the South,
reapportionment shrank the enormous skews that had long favored Democrats, the party of rural Dixie voters.53 But in the Northeast and the Midwest, equal district population disadvantaged Republicans, who dominated
the rural vote in those parts of the country.54 These offsetting partisan effects
may explain why both parties regarded the one person, one vote rule with
such equanimity. The chairman of the Democratic National Committee
called it “something the Democratic Party has long advocated, and fought
for, and certainly welcomes.”55 Not to be outdone, the Republican chair
thought it was “in the national interest and in the Party’s interest.”56 With
respect to the country as a whole, neither official was wrong.
B. Race and Redistricting
I turn next to the set of doctrines that regulate race and redistricting.
The cause of action for racial vote dilution, recognized under the Constitution in 197357 and explicated under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1986,58
49
See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY:
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 12 (2008).
50
See id. at 188.
51
See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting
and Public Expenditures in the American States, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 767, 772–73 (2002).
52
See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, JR., supra note 49, at 75. Partisan bias is the share of
legislative seats a party would win in a hypothetical, perfectly tied election minus fifty percent.
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 835.
53
See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, JR., supra note 49, at 77, 254.
54
See id. at 78, 254; see also GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 59–60 (2002) (showing the elimination of the pro-Republican bias in non-southern
states between 1960 and 1966).
55
J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
THE SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 220
(2014).
56
Id.
57
See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973).
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prohibits certain electoral practices that make it more difficult for minority
voters to elect their preferred candidates. The anti-retrogression principle,
announced under the VRA in 1976,59 forbids particular jurisdictions from
changing their election laws with the intent or effect of reducing the electoral influence of minority voters. And the theory of racial gerrymandering,
hinted at earlier60 but not endorsed by the Supreme Court until 199361—just
after the second era of good feelings—renders presumptively unlawful districts drawn for primarily racial reasons.
My first point about these doctrines may not be very surprising. When
the Court articulated them, its professed goals of promoting minority representation and avoiding racial essentialism pertained to race but not party. For
instance, in the first successful vote dilution case, White v. Regester, the
Court defined the constitutional injury as the use of electoral practices “invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups.”62
This harm plainly did not extend to the erosion of the voting strength of
partisan groups. Similarly, in the case that introduced the concept of retrogression, Beer v. United States, the Court conceived of it as a worsening “in
the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.”63 If it was partisan minorities whose exercise of the
franchise was undermined, that was not retrogression. In the first racial gerrymandering case as well, Shaw v. Reno, the Court objected to “the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race.”64 The
Court did not criticize the intentional sorting of voters on partisan grounds.65
Consistent with its racial focus in this period, the Court rebuffed the
one vote dilution challenge that it sensed was actually a vehicle for a partisan
grievance. In Whitcomb v. Chavis,66 African Americans in Indianapolis complained about a multimember district that, through its winner-take-all voting system, frequently prevented them from electing any of their preferred
candidates.67 The Court observed that the black “ghetto voted heavily Democratic and that ghetto votes were critical to Democratic Party success.”68
The Court further noted that, “had the Democrats won all of the elections
or even most of them, the ghetto would have had no justifiable complaints
about representation.”69 Accordingly, “the failure of the ghetto to have legisSee Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35–37 (1986).
See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1977).
61
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
62
White, 412 U.S. at 765; see also Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 47 (deeming “the essence of a
[statutory vote dilution] claim . . . that a certain electoral law . . . interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives” (emphasis added)).
63
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
64
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
65
See id. at 650 (“[N]othing in our history compels the conclusion that racial and political
gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny.”).
66
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
67
Id. at 128–29.
68
Id. at 150.
69
Id. at 152.
58
59
60
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lative seats in proportion to its population[ ]” was more “a function of losing
elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes.”70 The plaintiffs’ claim
of vote dilution was merely a “euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”71
My second point about the Court’s race-related doctrines may be more
counterintuitive. Not only was their intent nonpartisan, but so was their effect. This was because the theories applied almost exclusively to the South,
which remained under supermajority Democratic control in this period. Successful suits thus replaced white Democratic officeholders with minority
Democratic politicians—not with Republicans.72 Consider White, in which
the Court struck down multimember state house districts in Dallas and San
Antonio because they diluted the votes of blacks and Latinos, respectively.73
As a result of the decision, Texas had to create twenty-nine new singlemember districts.74 This remedy significantly boosted minority representation, but it did not even cause a ripple in the state house’s partisan balance.
Democrats slightly increased their advantage in the chamber in the first election after relief was granted, from 133–17 to 135–15.75
Or take Thornburg v. Gingles,76 the breakthrough case in which the
Court set forth the test for vote dilution under the VRA.77 Due to the decision, North Carolina had to split four multimember state house districts,
occupying much of Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham, into twenty-three single-member districts.78 Again, black representation surged in the wake of
this redistricting; and again, the Democratic edge in the state house stayed
essentially the same, inching upward from 82–38 to 84–36.79 Even Shaw,
handed down at the dawn of the hyperpartisan present, fits this pattern. In
1991, North Carolina designed the two black-majority districts whose odd
shapes the Court subsequently criticized.80 Yet in the 1992 election, Repub-

Id. at 153.
Id.; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial
Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 547 (2004) (arguing that in Whitcomb “the Court treated partisan politics as an explanatory factor that could defeat a claim of
unconstitutional racial vote dilution”).
72
For a similar argument, see Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1397
(2015) (“The secret undercurrent of the [early race-and-redistricting] cases is that they addressed only claims of exclusive Democratic control of southern jurisdictions . . . .”). But note
that the minority Democrats elected thanks to the Court’s intervention were generally more
liberal than the white Democrats they replaced. See, e.g., David Epstein et al., Estimating the
Effect of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 499, 514
(2007).
73
See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–69 (1973).
74
See id. at 770.
75
See Klarner, supra note 30 (reporting the 1973–74 and 1975–76 figures).
76
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
77
Id. at 56.
78
See id. at 77 (reversing the district court’s judgment with respect to a three-member
district); see also Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 377–79 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (requiring
other districts comprising twenty-three seats to be redrawn).
79
See Klarner, supra note 30 (reporting the 1985–86 and 1987–88 figures).
80
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634–36 (1993).
70
71
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licans kept their four congressional seats, and Democrats improved their tally
by one (from seven to eight).81
Generalizing from these cases, the proportion of southern state house
seats held by African Americans rose from 3% in 1970 to 13% in 1990.82
This growth was fueled by the VRA (and by the Court’s interpretations of
the statute, especially in Gingles).83 Over the same two decades, the share of
southern state house seats held by Democrats never fell below 70%.84 There
was therefore no link in this period between the Court’s race-related doctrines and the partisan composition of southern legislatures. The doctrines’
use did not threaten the Democrats’ hegemony.
C. Partisan Gerrymandering
The last redistricting theory I cover is partisan gerrymandering: the
drawing of district lines to benefit one party and handicap the opposing
party. I acknowledge that my argument about judicial intent does not apply
neatly to this theory. The Supreme Court announced the cause of action for
partisan gerrymandering in the 1986 case of Davis v. Bandemer85—firmly
within the second era of good feelings. Yet the Court’s only possible motive
for doing so was concern about the partisan manipulation of district boundaries. Plainly, nonpartisan cleavages like region and race could not have explained the Court’s creation of a doctrine about party abuse of the
mapmaking process.
Nevertheless, I find it revealing that the Court stressed the nonpartisanship of voters and legislators even as it endorsed an inherently partisan
theory. The plurality remarked that “[v]oters sometimes prefer Democratic
candidates, and sometimes Republican,”86 and Justice O’Connor added that
“voters can—and often do—move from one party to the other or support
candidates from both parties.”87 As I demonstrated earlier, these statements
were accurate with respect to the quite fickle electorate of the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s.88 The plurality further asserted that “a group of individuals who
votes for a losing candidate is usually . . . adequately represented by the
winning candidate” and has “as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district.”89 As I also showed above, this claim too
81
See Expert Report Dataset of Dr. Simon Jackman, League of Women Voters of N.C. v.
Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Jackman Rucho Dataset]
(compiling congressional election results). Democrats lost seats, of course, in the Republican
wave election of 1994, but over the decade as a whole, North Carolina’s congressional plan
remained slightly tilted in a Democratic direction. See id.
82
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1369
(2016).
83
See id. at 1371–80.
84
See id. at 1387.
85
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
86
Id. at 135 (plurality opinion).
87
Id. at 156 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
88
See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.
89
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion).
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was correct with respect to the more moderate officeholders of this period.
They did represent most of their constituents reasonably well, even constituents who backed their opponents.90 The Court’s comments therefore suggest
some ambivalence about the cause of action it recognized. The Court
seemed to want the availability of relief but its denial when voters and legislators behaved in their usual nonpartisan fashion.91
Whatever the Court’s thinking was, the impact of Bandemer—or,
rather, the lack thereof—was undeniable. Every single challenge that relied
on the case failed.92 As the Court later put it, Bandemer’s “application . . .
invariably produced the same result . . . as would have obtained if the question were nonjusticiable: Judicial intervention [was] refused.”93 Why were all
of these suits unsuccessful? One problem for plaintiffs was Bandemer’s requirement that a plan “consistently degrade” the electoral influence of a group
of voters.94 This condition precluded claims brought prior to the first election under a map, or even after one or two elections. Courts simply could not
be sure that a party’s electoral disadvantage was durable rather than transient.95 The other difficulty for plaintiffs was their obligation under
Bandemer to show diminished influence “on the political process as a
whole.”96 This language persuaded courts that redistricting alone was not
enough to call a plan into question. Unfair district lines had to be combined
with efforts to prevent a party’s supporters from registering or voting—efforts that did not commonly occur in this era.97
The futility of partisan gerrymandering litigation after Bandemer is consistent with my argument that judicial activity in this period did not have
significant partisan implications. It is also consistent with the empirical evidence about the severity and persistence of gerrymandering in the 1980s. At
both the state legislative and congressional levels, 1980s district plans were,
on net, the least skewed in either party’s direction of all maps from 1972 to

See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.
My view is shared by the law clerk who worked with Justice White on his opinion in
Bandemer. See Palma Joy Strand, Time to Protect Our Democracy, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2017, 1:43
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/09/if-anthony-kennedy-follows-precedenthell-strike-down-partisan-gerrymandering.html [https://perma.cc/MY6A-P73V]
(“[Bandemer] served as a placeholder for the court to enter the institutional conversation about
the parameters for redistricting if and when partisan gerrymandering . . . evolved to the level of
entrenched partisan dominance.”).
92
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–80 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n all of the
cases we are aware of involving that most common form of political gerrymandering [that is,
through redistricting], relief was denied.”).
93
Id. at 279.
94
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
95
See, e.g., La Porte City Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 43 F.3d 1126,
1128 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Plaintiffs have not offered to prove that the districts in La Porte
County have frustrated the will of a majority (or even a minority) of voters, for even one
election.”).
96
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
97
See, e.g., Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“[N]or are there
allegations that anyone has ever interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting,
fund-raising, or campaigning.”).
90
91
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the present.98 At the congressional level, 1980s plans were also the most
volatile. In this decade, there was almost no correlation between a map’s
skew in its first election and the tilt it would go on to exhibit in later elections.99 The judiciary’s discretion after Bandemer, then, was perhaps the better part of valor. Courts simply did not need to intervene in an era when
most gerrymanders were mild and ephemeral.
II. THE HYPERPARTISAN PRESENT
Times change, though. After three of the least tribal decades in American history, partisanship and polarization began to intensify in the 1990s.
They then rose steadily over the next generation, reaching unprecedented
levels for both voters and politicians by the 2010s. Again, I do not try to
describe all of the voluminous political science literature on this topic. But
again, just a few of the literature’s findings should suffice to show how different the hyperpartisan present is from the era of good feelings that preceded it.
Consider the behavior of contemporary voters. The rate of ticket splitting in federal elections fell from 25–30% in the 1970s and 1980s, to about
15% in the 1990s and 2000s, to below 10% in the 2010s.100 The correlation
between voters’ presidential and congressional choices increased in tandem:
from around 0.6 in the 1970s and 1980s, to roughly 0.8 in the 1990s and
2000s, to above 0.9 in the 2010s.101 Similarly, the ratings that survey respondents assign to the opposing party, which had hovered in the upper 40s (out
of 100) in the 1970s and 1980s, dipped to the low 40s in the 1990s, the
upper 30s in the 2000s, and the low 20s in the 2010s.102 About one-third of
Democratic respondents and one-half of Republicans in the 2010s also said
they would be upset if a child of theirs entered into an inter-party marriage;
this fraction had been just one-twentieth in the 1960s.103 And when
prompted to state their ideologies on a seven-point scale, fewer voters called
themselves moderates in the 2010s than in the 1970s and 1980s, and more

98
See Assessing the Current Wisconsin State Legislative Redistricting Plan at 47, Whitford v. Nichol, No. 3:15-cv-421 (W.D. Wis. July 7, 2015), ECF No. 1-3 [hereinafter Jackman
Whitford Rep.]; Assessing the Current North Carolina Congressional Districting Plan:
amended report at 30, League of Women Voters of N.C. v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Jackman Rucho Rep.].
99
See Eric McGhee et al., The Role of Partisan Gerrymandering in U.S. Elections 11 (Aug.
29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
100
See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, It’s Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections, 77 J. POL. 861, 864 (2015).
101
See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven Webster, The Rise of Negative Partisanship and
the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century, 41 ELECTORAL STUD. 12, 18 (2016).
102
See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt & Marc J. Hetherington, Look How Far We’ve Come Apart,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:48 PM), https://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/
17/look-how-far-weve-come-apart/ [https://perma.cc/PYX8-2Z56].
103
See Iyengar et al., supra note 14, at 417.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252063

522

Harvard Law & Policy Review

[Vol. 13

identified as liberals or conservatives.104 The ideological distance between the
average Democrat and the average Republican thus doubled,105 and the correlation between voters’ views and their party identifications climbed even
more rapidly.106
Take legislators’ voting records too. Starting around 1980, and accelerating after 1990, the difference in ideal points between the median Democratic member of Congress and the median Republican grew almost every
term.107 The House of Representatives now sitting (the 115th) features the
largest inter-party gap ever recorded—breaking a record previously set by
each of the last eight Houses.108 Thanks to this unparalleled polarization, not
one Democratic (Republican) member of Congress today is more conservative (liberal) than even a single legislator from the opposing party.109 To the
contrary, the distribution of congressional ideal points is almost perfectly
bimodal. There are liberal and conservative spires and a yawning void between them.
As I noted at the outset, redistricting law could have responded to these
developments in three distinct ways. First, it could have gone into remission,
rarely being invoked (even less often successfully) as partisanship became increasingly salient. Call this the dormancy response. Second, nonpartisan
causes of action could have been deployed to fight the partisan manipulation
of district lines. These claims could have been sustained even when the real
grievance was partisan—and not, say, unequal district population, the reduction of minority representation, or racial essentialism. Think of this as the
repackaging response. And third, redistricting law could have tackled partisan
gerrymandering head-on, by evaluating district plans based on their partisan
intent and/or effect. This would be the direct response to modern
hyperpartisanship.
I maintain below that only the first two of these responses have, in fact,
materialized in the Supreme Court’s case law. At times over the last generation, the Court’s redistricting doctrines have declined precipitously in their
use and efficacy. At other times (especially more recently), the doctrines have
been redirected at partisan abuses far afield from their original domains. But
never has the Court (and only very infrequently have other courts) struck
down partisan gerrymanders because they are partisan gerrymanders, rather
than due to some other legal defect.

104
See, e.g., DONALD R. KINDER & NATHAN P. KALMOE, NEITHER LIBERAL NOR
CONSERVATIVE: IDEOLOGICAL INNOCENCE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 54 (2017).
105
See, e.g., Hetherington, supra note 17, at 442.
106
See, e.g., Gerald C. Wright & Nathaniel Birkhead, The Macro Sort of the State Electorates, 67 POL. RES. Q. 426, 426 (2014).
107
See Parties Overview, supra note 11; The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, supra
note 20.
108
See Parties Overview, supra note 11; The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, supra
note 20.
109
See Han & Brady, supra note 21, at 510–11.
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A. Malapportionment
Beginning again with one person, one vote, the area has exhibited a
classic dormancy response over the last three decades. By my count, the
Court has decided just two traditional malapportionment cases, involving
statewide plans challenged due to their large population variances, in this
period. And in both of these cases, the Court upheld the disputed map. In a
1993 case, the Court sustained an Ohio state house plan whose total population deviation exceeded the 10% threshold for presumptive constitutionality,
but was attributable to the state’s effort to respect county boundaries.110
Likewise, in a 2012 case, the Court ratified a West Virginia congressional
map whose total population variance was more than de minimis, but
stemmed from legitimate goals like following county lines and preserving the
cores of existing districts.111
The paucity of recent one person, one vote cases has a clear explanation.
After having many of their plans invalidated in earlier decades,112 states
learned to draw districts with very similar populations. In the current cycle,
for example, ninety-three of ninety-nine state legislative maps have total
population deviations at or below the 10% cutoff.113 At the congressional
level, every single plan has a total population variance below 1%, and the
districts in twenty-eight states differ in population by no more than one
person.114 Population inequalities this small do not plausibly threaten the injury that triggered the Court’s intervention in the 1960s: rural overrepresentation and urban and suburban political weakness. As this harm has receded,
so has the volume of judicial activity.
Notwithstanding this overall trend, a repackaging response has also appeared in the malapportionment case law. One person, one vote claims have
occasionally been used to strike down partisan gerrymanders whose population deviations were small but aimed at partisan gain.115 The Court’s 2004
decision, Cox v. Larios,116 remains the best illustration of this doctrinal reaction.117 Georgia Democrats, still clinging to power in 2001 despite the state’s
pro-Republican drift, enacted an aggressive pro-Democratic gerrymander.118
110
More specifically, the Court held that the lower court had erred in assuming that a
total population deviation above 10% is automatically unconstitutional. See Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1993).
111
See Tennant v. Jefferson City Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 764–65 (2012).
112
See COX & KATZ, supra note 54, at 4 (observing that almost every map in the country
was redrawn during the one person, one vote revolution of the 1960s).
113
See 2010 Redistricting Deviation Table, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July
6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2010-ncsl-redistricting-deviation-table.
aspx [https://perma.cc/R6YF-7QFT].
114
See id.
115
For other scholars noticing this development, see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 71,
at 567–69; and Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 384–86 (2017).
116
542 U.S. 947 (2004) (mem.).
117
Id.
118
See id. at 947–49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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This map cracked (or dispersed) and packed (or overconcentrated) Republican voters, generating a large pro-Democratic skew in the 2002 election.119
More relevant here, the map also “systematically underpopulat[ed] the districts held by incumbent Democrats” and “overpopulat[ed] those of Republicans.”120 “Republican-leaning districts” were thus “vastly more overpopulated
as a whole than Democratic-leaning districts,” “with many of the large positive population deviations in districts that paired Republican incumbents
against each other.”121 Even though the plan’s total population variance was
less than 10%, the Court found it unlawful. “[T]he drafters’ desire to give an
electoral advantage . . . to certain incumbents . . . did not justify the conceded deviations from the principle of one person, one vote.”122
Larios was arguably idiosyncratic in that the Court summarily affirmed
the lower court’s judgment,123 and so did not issue a clearly precedential ruling.124 But in the 2016 case of Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission,125 the Court gave plenary consideration to a claim that “almost
all the Democratic-leaning districts [in Arizona’s legislature] are somewhat
underpopulated and almost all the Republican-leaning districts are somewhat overpopulated.”126 The Court rejected the claim because the reason for
the pattern was the commission’s desire to comply with the VRA—not an
intent to benefit Democrats.127 In denying the claim, though, the Court confirmed its legal availability. If “it is more probable than not that a deviation
of less than 10% reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment
factors,” such as “partisanship,” then a map is unconstitutional.128
Since Harris, several lower courts have invalidated partisan gerrymanders on malapportionment grounds. In North Carolina, in particular, a trio
of county-level plans have been nullified, all designed by the Republican legislature and featuring underpopulated Republican districts and overpopulated Democratic districts.129 The Supreme Court’s 1983 dictum that one
person, one vote “is far less ambitious than would be required to address
119
See id.; see also Simon Jackman Dataset, Whitford v. Nichol, No. 3:15-cv-00421 (W.D.
Wis. July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Jackman Whitford Dataset] (recording a pro-Democratic efficiency gap of 7% in Georgia’s 2002 election).
120
Larios, 542 U.S. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp.
2d 1320, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004)).
121
Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1331).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 947.
124
Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1800 (2015) (“[A] summary affirmance . . . has considerably less precedential value than an opinion on the merits.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
125
136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
126
Id. at 1309.
127
See id. at 1309–10. The Latino-majority districts the commission drew to abide by the
VRA were mostly underpopulated and Democratic-leaning. See id.
128
Id. at 1307, 1310.
129
Two of these plans were struck down after Harris. See Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v.
Wake City Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 345–51 (4th Cir. 2016); City of Greensboro v.
Guilford City Bd. of Elections, 251 F. Supp. 3d 935, 942–49 (M.D.N.C. 2017). One plan was
struck down shortly before Harris. See Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 263–68 (4th
Cir. 2015).
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gerrymandering”130 therefore no longer seems operative. Thanks to Larios
and Harris, the doctrine’s ambition now extends to gerrymanders that differentially populate each party’s districts.
B. Race and Redistricting
1. Dormancy
Turning to race and redistricting, all of the relevant legal theories have
been deployed less often, and to less effect, over the last generation. In my
terminology, the theories have undergone a dormancy response as partisanship has eclipsed and subsumed concerns about minority representation and
racial essentialism. Racial vote dilution decisions, first, peaked in frequency
in 1992 and have become progressively rarer ever since.131 Moreover, “[a]s
the number of [vote dilution] cases has fallen over time, the rate of plaintiff
success has also declined.”132 More than two-fifths of vote dilution plaintiffs
were victorious in the 1980s, compared to about a quarter in the 1990s and
less than one-fifth in the 2000s.133
In the Supreme Court, the 2009 case of Bartlett v. Strickland134 is emblematic of the hyperpartisan present.135 In its controlling opinion, the plurality refused to authorize vote dilution claims in areas where only
“crossover” districts could be drawn: districts in which minority voters make
up less than a majority of the population, but are still able to elect their
preferred candidates thanks to support from white voters.136 The plurality’s
reason for not permitting crossover claims was that, in its view, they would
be used to improve representation for parties rather than for minority voters.
“The easiest and most likely alliance for a group of minority voters is one
with a political party,” the plurality reasoned.137 Crossover claims would thus
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 n.6 (1983).
See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 14 (2008).
132
Id.; see also Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 656 (2006)
(“Courts identified violations of Section 2 more frequently between 1982 and 1992 than in the
years since.”).
133
See Cox & Miles, supra note 131, at 14; see also Katz et al., supra note 132, at 656.
134
556 U.S. 1 (2009).
135
In the lower courts, the most notable case in this vein is League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), in which the Fifth Circuit declared that unlawful vote dilution occurs “only where Democrats lose because they are black,
not where blacks lose because they are Democrats,” id. at 854. Also worth flagging is the
Supreme Court’s decision this past term in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018), a case
involving both racial vote dilution and racial gerrymandering claims. In discussing the vote
dilution claims, the Court observed that “a voter’s race sometimes correlates closely with political party preference,” and that in the case at hand, “the two factors were virtually indistinguishable.” Id. at 2314. These remarks may help explain why the Court ruled against the vote
dilution claims. See id. at 2330–34. The claims may have seemed to the Court like thinly
disguised partisan grievances.
136
See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13.
137
Id. at 22.
130
131
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produce a “fusion of race and party affiliation”138 and “result in political party
‘entitlement . . . to a certain number of seats.’”139 “[R]elying on a combination of race and party,” the claims “would involve the law and courts in a
perilous enterprise” and “distort and frustrate” the nonpartisan goals of vote
dilution law.140
Second, the proportion of election laws blocked by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) because of their retrogressive intent or effect dropped even
more quickly than the volume of vote dilution litigation over the last three
decades. Indeed, this fraction ultimately fell to zero after the Supreme Court
neutered the VRA provision requiring certain (mostly southern) jurisdictions
to obtain preclearance before changing their electoral practices.141 From the
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, about 6% of new voting measures in covered
jurisdictions were objected to by the DOJ.142 This percentage declined to just
over 1% from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, and to 0.6% from the early
1980s to the mid-2000s.143 In the 1990s and 2000s specifically, the share was
even lower: a miniscule 0.1%.144 And since the Court’s 2013 decision in
Shelby County v. Holder145 (about which more in a moment), the DOJ has
lacked the authority to stop any retrogressive laws.146
Even before the VRA’s preclearance provision was annulled, it was
hobbled by its interaction with hyperpartisanship. In the 2003 case of Georgia v. Ashcroft,147 the same Georgia Democrats who manipulated districts’
populations in Larios “reduced by five the number of districts with a black
voting age population in excess of 60%.”148 Although this reduction made it
“more difficult for minority voters to elect their candidate of choice” in these
districts, the Court deemed the plan non-retrogressive.149 Why? Because the
potential decline in black representation was more than offset by the likely
gain in Democratic representation.150 The map “increase[d] the number of
Democratic Senate seats,” and so “increase[d] the prospects of Democratic
victory.”151 And in the Court’s opinion, it was permissible for Georgia to
trade some black legislators for more Democratic ones. “The State may
choose . . . that it is better to risk having fewer minority representatives in

138

Id.
Id. (quoting Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1539 (2002)).
140
Id. at 22–23.
141
This provision is Section 5 of the VRA. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012).
142
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT &
REAUTHORIZATION, at 27 (2006), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/051006VRAStatReport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8NM2-CT7Z].
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
570 U.S. 529 (2013).
146
Id. at 556–57.
147
539 U.S. 461 (2003).
148
Id. at 470.
149
Id. at 487.
150
Id. at 489.
151
Id. at 469, 489.
139
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order to . . . increase[e] the number of [Democratic] representatives sympathetic to the interests of minority voters.”152
After Georgia eroded the anti-retrogression principle, Shelby County
administered the coup de grâce. In nullifying the VRA’s preclearance
formula, the Court insisted that racial discrimination in voting is not as severe a problem in the hyperpartisan present as it was in the less partisan (but
more racist) past.153 “[H]istory did not end in 1965,” the Court reminded its
readers.154 “Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically,” and
“[t]here is no denying . . . that the conditions that originally justified [the
anti-retrogression rule] no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”155 In particular, “voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States have risen dramatically,” such that “the Nation is no longer
divided along those lines.”156 The Nation may well be divided along other
lines—partisan ones—but it is not split on the basis of race, at least not
according to the Court.157
And third, like activity under the VRA, racial gerrymandering suits
have become less common and less successful in recent years. Between the
doctrine’s creation in 1993 and the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Easley
v. Cromartie,158 federal and state courts resolved twenty-nine racial gerrymandering cases, striking down districts in seventeen of them.159 In the cycle
after Cromartie, though, courts issued judgments in just eleven racial gerrymandering cases, and invalidated districts in only two of them.160 The volume of litigation thus fell by more than 60%, and plaintiffs’ win rate by
almost 70%.
Why was Cromartie so pivotal? Because in it, the Court recognized partisanship as a defense to a charge of racial gerrymandering.161 The plaintiffs
contended that a contorted North Carolina district (another iteration of the
district previously rejected in Shaw v. Reno) was designed primarily for racial
reasons.162 The defendants responded that “the creation of a safe Democratic
seat” was the essential motivation for the district’s construction.163 And the
152
Id. at 483. While the Court allowed this tradeoff in theory, the state actually managed
to increase the number of Democratic seats without reducing the number of black-majority
districts. See id. at 470–71. Additionally, the portion of Georgia permitting the sacrifice of
minority-ability districts was later overturned by Congress. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (barring
any retrogression in “the ability” of minority citizens “to elect their preferred candidates of
choice”).
153
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 551.
154
Id. at 552.
155
Id. at 534, 547.
156
Id. at 551.
157
See id.
158
532 U.S. 234 (2001).
159
These figures are based on a dataset compiled by Morgan Kousser and on file with the
author.
160
I again derive these figures from Kousser’s dataset. I also stop this analysis in the 2000s
because, as I discuss below, racial gerrymandering doctrine has experienced a strong repackaging response in the 2010s.
161
See Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 244–57.
162
See id. (discussing in detail the plaintiffs’ evidence).
163
Id. at 239.
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Court agreed with them, in the process finding clear error in the district
court’s contrary conclusion and announcing that, to prevail, a litigant must
prove that “race rather than politics predominantly explains [a district’s]
boundaries.”164 Needless to say, such a showing can seldom be made in an era
when most mapmakers are preoccupied with partisan advantage. As Bruce
Cain and Emily Zhang have written, “[t]his requirement likely encompasses
so few redistricting scenarios as to almost entirely neutralize any effect that
the racial gerrymandering doctrine might have.”165
There is compelling evidence of a dormancy response, then, in the law
of race and redistricting. Decisions like Bartlett, Georgia, Shelby County, and
Cromartie also suggest an explanation for this response: the Court’s view that
partisanship is the preeminent cleavage in modern American politics, and
that claims of racial vote dilution, retrogression, and racial gerrymandering
are often linked to—or a façade for—partisan ploys. If partisanship is the
actual driver of nominally racial challenges, it is sensible for a judiciary that
wants to avoid partisan entanglements to refrain from intervention.
2. Repackaging
Another option, of course, for a judiciary that wants to curb partisan
abuses rather than to dodge them, is to use race-related theories to attack
partisan gerrymandering. This is the repackaging response, and it too has
been evident in the Court’s case law on vote dilution and racial gerrymandering (though not retrogression166). The Court’s 2006 decision in League of
United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry167 exemplifies the redeployment of vote dilution doctrine.168 As part of a mid-decade re-redistricting, Texas Republicans eliminated a Latino-majority district in order to
“‘serve[ ] the dual goal of increasing Republican seats in general and protecting [the Republican incumbent] in particular.’”169 Even though “the State’s
action was taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons,”170 the Court
found it “a denial of opportunity in the real sense of that term,” and hence
unlawful under the VRA.171
The LULAC Court also devised a rule that rendered irrelevant the new
Latino-majority district that Texas created to compensate for the destruction
of the old one. The new district’s flaw—an error previously unknown to vote
Id. at 243.
Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting
Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 886 (2016); see also Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 69 n.178 (2004) (discussing the role
of Cromartie in reducing racial gerrymandering litigation in the 2000s).
166
An exception in the lower courts is Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133
(D.D.C. 2012), vacated 570 U.S. 928 (2013), a pre-Shelby County case that denied preclearance
to a set of pro-Republican district plans in Texas.
167
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 425.
170
Id. at 440.
171
Id. at 429.
164
165
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dilution law—was that it combined Latinos with “different characteristics,
needs, and interests.”172 So novel was this “cultural noncompactness”173 argument that it induced bafflement in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent:
“Whatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is not vote
dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity.”174 And indeed, vote dilution was
not the evil the Court sought to combat. Rather, it was the perceived unfairness of voters being on the verge of ousting their unpopular incumbent but
being prevented from doing so by the politically motivated redrawing of
their district.
The Court’s racial gerrymandering cases in the current cycle are another
example of repackaging.175 In 2011, Republican mapmakers in several southern states with large African American populations adopted the same strategy: concentrating black voters (who reliably support Democratic candidates)
in a small number of districts, and dispersing white Republican voters more
efficiently across the remaining districts.176 In a 2015 decision, the Court
rejected the variant of this tactic used by Alabama: “maintain[ing] roughly
the same black population percentage in existing majority-minority districts.”177 In a 2017 case, the Court objected to Virginia’s analogous approach: “ensuring that each district would have a black voting age population
. . . of at least 55%.”178 As a result, about two dozen state legislative districts,
all components of Republican gerrymanders, had to be reconfigured.179
Also in 2017, the Court confronted North Carolina’s “racial target” that
“African-Americans should make up no less than a majority of the votingage population” in two congressional districts.180 In Cooper v. Harris,181 the
172
Id. at 434; see also id. at 424 (observing that the Latinos in the district “have divergent
‘needs and interests’ . . . owing to ‘differences in socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and other characteristics’”) (quoting Sessions v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 502,
512 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
173
See Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48
(2006) (coining the term); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1903, 1975–80 (2012) (commenting on the “spatial diversity” of the Latino population in the new Latino-majority district).
174
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
175
The possibility of using racial gerrymandering doctrine to pursue partisan goals was
noted much earlier (albeit in dissent). See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 920–21 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is inevitable that allegations of racial gerrymandering will become a
standard means by which unsuccessful . . . parties[ ] will seek to obtain judicially what they
could not obtain electorally.”).
176
For more on the Republican redistricting strategy in the current cycle, see DAVID
DALEY, RATF**KED: WHY YOUR VOTE DOESN’T COUNT (2016).
177
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2015).
178
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017).
179
See id. at 795 (vacating and remanding as to eleven districts); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, No. 3:14-CV-852, 2018 WL 3133819, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2018) (striking down these eleven districts on remand); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F.
Supp. 3d 1026, 1033-34 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (invalidating twelve districts on remand).
180
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468 (2017). And in the Court’s most recent term,
it struck down a Texas state house district that was formed when “the Legislature moved
Latinos into the district to bring the Latino population back above 50%.” Abbott v. Perez, 138
S. Ct. 2305, 2334 (2018).
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Court deemed this 50% black threshold as racially motivated as Virginia’s
55% black cutoff and Alabama’s freezing of black population shares.182 The
Court also rebuffed North Carolina’s defense that Republican gain, not race,
was the impetus for one of the two districts. “[I]f legislators use race as their
predominant districting criterion with the end goal of advancing their partisan interests . . . their action still triggers strict scrutiny.”183 “[T]he sorting of
voters on the grounds of their race remains suspect even if race is meant to
function as a proxy for other (including political) characteristics.”184
I have added the italics for a reason. In this passage, the Court effectively abandoned the position it had adopted in Cromartie: that race and
politics are conceptually distinct purposes, and that a district is unconstitutional only if “race rather than politics predominantly explains [its] boundaries.”185 In place of that artificial separation, the Court now acknowledged
that race and politics are tightly interwoven (especially in the South), and
that race can therefore be used to craft a partisan gerrymander. When race is
so used, a district is presumptively unlawful, even if the mapmaker’s ultimate
goal is partisan advantage rather than racial essentialism. The partisan aim
does not rescue the district—in fact, it condemns it—so long as the end is
achieved through racial means.186
C. Partisan Gerrymandering
This leaves the cause of action for partisan gerrymandering, whose defining feature has been disuse: in my vocabulary, the absence of a direct
response to the rise of hyperpartisanship. After Bandemer, the Supreme
Court decided two more partisan gerrymandering cases on the merits: Vieth
v. Jubelirer187 in 2004 and LULAC in 2006. This past term, the Court resolved two further partisan gerrymandering disputes on procedural grounds:
Gill v. Whitford188 and Benisek v. Lamone.189 In none of these suits did the
Court rule in favor of the plaintiffs.

137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
See id. at 1469.
183
Id. at 1473 n.7 (emphasis added).
184
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 1464 n.1 (“A plaintiff succeeds . . . even if . . . a
legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including
political ones.”).
185
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001).
186
For another scholar making a similar observation, see Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party,
Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1837, 1854 (2018) (“[T]he racial gerrymandering cause of action has been repurposed for new partisan warfare . . . .”). In his dissent
in Harris, Justice Alito sharply objected to the partisan repackaging of the racial gerrymandering cause of action. Through this repackaging, in his view, “the federal courts will be transformed into weapons of political warfare,” and “the losers in the redistricting process [will]
seek to obtain in court what they could not achieve in the political arena.” 137 S. Ct. at 1490
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
188
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
181
182
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In Vieth, first, the Court did not merely uphold the challenged Pennsylvania plan. The Court also discarded the test it had adopted in
Bandemer—whether a map “consistently degrade[s] . . . a group of voters’
influence on the political process as a whole”190—and came within one vote
of declaring the doctrine nonjusticiable.191 In LULAC, similarly, the Court
was unmoved by the mid-decade timing of Texas’s re-redistricting, which
made it unusually easy to infer the state’s partisan purpose.192 The Court was
unwilling as well to embrace a quantitative measure of partisan asymmetry
proposed by a group of political scientist amici.193
In Whitford, too, the Court avoided engaging with the appellees’ proposed legal standard by holding that they had not yet proven their standing
to sue.194 In a striking display of passivity, the Court also replied to the appellees’ argument that only the judiciary is “capable of solving this problem”
by stating that “[s]uch invitations must be answered with care.”195 Neither
the “default of politically accountable officers”196 nor a “‘failure of political
will’”197 necessitates judicial intervention. The Court further characterized
the consequence of partisan gerrymandering—a legislature whose partisan
composition diverges sharply from that of the electorate—as “a collective
political interest, not an individual legal interest.”198 In the Court’s view, it
was “not responsible for vindicating” such “generalized partisan
preferences.”199
And in Benisek, the Court managed to dispose of the case on an even
more technical basis. According to the Court, the appellants had been tardy
in mounting their challenge, and by the summer of 2018 it was too late “to
189
138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018). And in a third partisan gerrymandering case, the Court summarily vacated the lower court’s judgment for reconsideration in light of Whitford. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018)
(mem.).
190
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion).
191
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281–84 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the Bandemer test); id. at
306 (“declin[ing] to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.”).
192
See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., joined by Alito, J.) (“[T]here is nothing inherently suspect about a legislature’s
decision to replace mid-decade a court-ordered plan with one of its own.”).
193
See id. at 420 (“I would conclude asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”).
194
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929–34 (2018). Because of its ruling on standing, the Court “express[ed] no view on the merits of the plaintiffs’ case.” Id. at 1934. The
Court acknowledged that “the contours and justiciability of [partisan gerrymandering claims]
are unresolved”—and left them equally murky. Id. at 1922.
195
Id. at 1929 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
196
Id.
197
Id. (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
198
Id. at 1932.
199
Id. at 1933. In her concurring opinion, however, Justice Kagan accurately observed
“‘the death-knell of bipartisanship,’ creating a legislative environment that is ‘toxic’ and ‘tribal.’” Id. at 1940 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). She further noted that
“[g]errymanders have thus become ever more extreme and durable,” with “[t]he 2010 redistricting cycle produc[ing] some of the worst partisan gerrymanders on record.” Id. at 1941. But
this awareness of modern hyperpartisanship was nowhere to be found in the majority opinion.
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ensure the timely completion of a new districting scheme in advance of the
2018 election season.”200 The Court therefore declined to issue a preliminary
injunction barring Maryland’s plan from being used again.201
Unsurprisingly, lower courts have largely followed the Supreme Court’s
lead. Just as every suit that relied on the Bandemer test failed,202 so did every
partisan gerrymandering claim in federal court between 2004 (when Vieth
was decided) and 2016.203 Indeed, “claimants’ record over this generationlong period [was] roughly zero wins and fifty losses.”204 Prior to 2016, the
only glimmers of hope for plaintiffs were a series of Florida state court cases
won under a Florida constitutional provision banning redistricting with partisan intent.205 Since 2016, plaintiffs have succeeded in one more state court
case, this time under the Pennsylvania constitution,206 and preliminarily in
two federal cases: one against Wisconsin’s state house plan,207 the other
against North Carolina’s congressional map.208 I helped to litigate the federal
cases—both of whose judgments were recently vacated by the Supreme
Court and remanded for further proceedings—and I say more about them
below.
First, though, I highlight certain comments the Court made about
voter and legislator behavior in Vieth, its most important modern decision on
partisan gerrymandering. These remarks, in my view, reveal the Court’s failure to grasp the realities of the hyperpartisan present. As to voters, the Court
asserted that “[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but
may shift from one election to the next; and even within a given election, not
all voters follow the party line.”209 This was true enough of voters in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, who often switched their party allegiances and split
their tickets.210 But as I discussed earlier, it is mostly false with respect to
today’s far more loyal voters.211 The election-to-election stability of voters’
choices is now extremely high, and only a tiny fraction of voters in federal
elections now split their tickets.212
As to legislators, the Court stated that “the Constitution does not answer the question whether it is better for Democratic voters to have their
Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018).
See id.
202
See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
203
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 840–41, 846–49.
204
Id. at 833.
205
See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a); see also League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner,
172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015); In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176,
83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012).
206
See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737
(Pa. 2018).
207
See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018).
208
See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 2679 (U.S. 2018) (mem.).
209
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004) (plurality opinion).
210
See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.
212
See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.
200
201
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State’s congressional delegation include 10 wishy-washy Democrats . . . or 5
hardcore Democrats.”213 This was indeed a dilemma a generation ago, when
many liberal, moderate, and conservative Democrats were elected to Congress, and Democratic voters could plausibly choose between these different
models of representation.214 But as I also showed above, it is no longer a
quandary today, because every single Democratic member of Congress is
now more liberal than every single Republican.215 Under modern political
conditions, the choice is thus not between “10 wishy-washy Democrats” and
“5 hardcore Democrats.” Rather, it is between 10 liberal Democrats and 5
liberal Democrats—which is hardly a choice at all for Democratic voters.
Notably, the federal courts that recently ruled in favor of partisan gerrymandering plaintiffs recognized the partisanship of contemporary voters and
legislators. As to voters, the North Carolina court favorably cited witness
testimony that “‘past voting behavior,’ as reflected in ‘past election results,’ is
‘the best predictor of future election success.’”216 Because voters’ partisan
preferences are so consistent, “‘once a precinct is found to be a strong Democratic precinct, it’s probably going to act as a strong Democratic precinct in
every subsequent election,’” and “‘[t]he same would be true for Republican
precincts.’”217 As to legislators, the Wisconsin court found that Republican
representatives “who win by slimmer margins” are not “more receptive to the
needs of their Democratic constituents.”218 This is because a “strong caucus
system” exists in the Wisconsin legislature, resulting in “very little effort to
woo colleagues from ‘across the aisle.’”219 Based on my earlier empirical survey,220 I have little doubt that these courts are correct (and that the Supreme
Court’s contrary views are outdated and wrong).
The North Carolina and Wisconsin courts were also presented with
evidence that the severity and persistence of partisan gerrymandering have
increased sharply. At both the state legislative and congressional levels, the
average district plan in the current cycle is more skewed than at any point

213
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 n.9 (plurality opinion). The Court also assumed that legislator
ideology is a function of district composition. See id. This too is wrong. See Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, The Measure of a Metric: The Debate over Quantifying
Partisan Gerrymandering, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1503, 1549–51 (surveying the literature showing
that legislators are almost equally extreme no matter how close or safe their seats are).
214
See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
215
See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text.
216
Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 600 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 138
S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (mem.).
217
Id. at 602; see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 848 (W.D. Wis. 2016),
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (noting the “almost perfect” relationship between two different
measures of Wisconsin voters’ partisanship).
218
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 901 n.266.
219
Id. at 895 n.227, 901 n.266; see also League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737, 790 (Pa. 2018) (“[G]iven the extreme political polarization between the two political parties, Republican representatives will not adequately represent
Democrats’ interests, thus shutting Democratic voters out of the political process.”).
220
See supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
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since 1972.221 The 2012 election, in particular, saw the largest partisan tilts
in modern history.222 At both electoral levels, too, the correlation between a
map’s initial skew and the tilt it goes on to exhibit subsequently has never
been stronger.223 It is now above 0.8 for congressional plans, for instance,
compared to less than 0.1 in the 1980s.224 These developments likely stem
from voters’ heightened partisanship, which makes their behavior easier for
mapmakers to forecast. And while the trends have yet to elicit a direct response from the Supreme Court, they may well be responsible for the North
Carolina and Wisconsin courts’ decisions to trek further into the thicket.
CONCLUSION
I did not try to hide my normative views in the preceding section: that
the Supreme Court’s failure to respond directly to partisan gerrymandering
in a hyperpartisan age is deeply problematic, and that the North Carolina
and Wisconsin courts were right to strike down the challenged maps. Because I have explained my position elsewhere,225 I do not wish to repeat the
case for judicial intervention here. But I do want to close by making a related
point: that despite the superficial appeal of trying to curb gerrymandering
through less controversial, nonpartisan legal theories, a repackaging response
is not ultimately a viable strategy. A direct judicial response to gerrymandering is therefore necessary, even though it requires courts to grab the live wire
of partisan politics.
What is the problem with a repackaging response? In a nutshell, that in
most circumstances it does not actually solve the problem. Precisely because
the legal theory invoked is nonpartisan, mapmakers can generally cure the
constitutional or statutory violation while preserving their party’s advantage.
They are not compelled to take the steps—uncracking and unpacking the
opposing party’s voters—that would, in fact, produce a balanced plan.
Consider a Larios-style one person, one vote claim: that a partisan gerrymander overpopulates one party’s (and underpopulates the other party’s)
districts. When such a claim succeeds, the line-drawing party can easily
eliminate the malapportionment but still distribute its voters much more efficiently across the revised map’s districts. Indeed, this is almost exactly what
happened in the lower court litigation that preceded the Supreme Court’s

221
See Jackman Rucho Rep., supra note 98, at 30; Jackman Whitford Rep., supra note 98, at
47; see also Anthony J. McGann et al., Gerrymandering in America: the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Popular Sovereignty 4–5, 97–98 (2016) (reporting
similar findings using partisan bias as a metric).
222
See Jackman Rucho Rep., supra note 98, at 30; Jackman Whitford Rep., supra note 98, at
47.
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See McGhee et al., supra note 99, at 11.
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See id.
225
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1.
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decision in Vieth.226 Pennsylvania’s original congressional plan was struck
down in early 2002 due to a total population deviation of nineteen persons.227 Pennsylvania Republicans subsequently rectified this (tiny) variance
while maintaining the map’s (enormous) pro-Republican tilt.228 The initial
plan was expected to give Republicans a supermajority share of the state’s
districts,229 and the amended map did enable them to win twelve of nineteen
seats in the 2002 election.230
Or take race-related challenges like those in LULAC and in Harris.
After their original congressional plan was found to dilute the electoral influence of Latino voters in 2006, Texas Republicans replaced the offending
Latino-majority district—the one that joined Latinos with “different characteristics, needs, and interests”231—with a new Latino-majority district that
lacked this flaw.232 The revised map was no longer unlawfully dilutive, but it
was every bit as skewed in Republicans’ favor. Its pro-Republican tilt in the
2006 election actually exceeded that of its predecessor.233 Similarly, after two
of their initial congressional districts were deemed racial gerrymanders in
2016, North Carolina Republicans redrew the state’s entire plan, this time
ignoring race but explicitly requiring “[t]he partisan makeup of the congressional delegation” to be “10 Republicans and 3 Democrats.”234 Sure enough,
ten Republicans and three Democrats were elected in the 2016 election, resulting in the largest partisan skew of any map in the country.235
Indeed, there is only one scenario in which a repackaging response is
likely to be effective: when the original plan was enacted by a single party in
full control of the state government, but the balance of power shifted prior to
the court decision invalidating the map. In this situation, no party has
enough sway to pass a partisan gerrymander, so the remedial plan must be
either a bipartisan compromise or a court-imposed solution. This series of
events is not entirely unheard of. It occurred, for example, after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Larios, because by 2004 Republicans had won a majority
in one chamber of the Georgia legislature. Consequently, after the elected
branches failed to agree on a remedy, a special master crafted a map that was
more neutral than the previous pro-Democratic gerrymander.236 But even
though the sequence is plausible, it is far from common. Typically, the ger226
It is not exactly what happened because the original plan was invalidated on conventional (not Larios-style) malapportionment grounds. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp.
2d 672, 675–78 (M.D. Pa. 2002). But this in no way affects my point.
227
See id.
228
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
229
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
230
See Jackman Rucho Dataset, supra note 79.
231
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006).
232
See LULAC v. Perry, 457 F. Supp. 2d 716, 718–20 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
233
See Jackman Rucho Dataset, supra note 79 (recording a pro-Republican efficiency gap
of 9.5% in 2006, compared to 9.0% in 2004).
234
Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 603 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 138
S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (mem.).
235
See id. at 660.
236
See Larios v. Cox, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1364–73 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (approving the
special master’s plan); see also Jackman Whitford Dataset, supra note 119 (showing that the
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rymandering party does not lose control of the state government halfway
through the decade—precisely because of the edge it gains from its carefully
carved boundaries.237 The occasional successes of repackaging thus do not
render it a feasible judicial strategy. The wins are simply too rare and politically contingent.
In contrast, when courts respond directly to partisan gerrymandering,
their judgments neither can be circumvented nor depend on quirks of political fate. Say a party reenacts a highly skewed plan after its initial handiwork
was rejected due to excessive partisanship. Any court worth its salt would
rebuff the proposed remedy as well, and then would design the new map
itself rather than give the party another bite at the apple.238 At least, any
reasonable court would do so in a case, like the North Carolina and Wisconsin suits, litigated on an effect-based theory of partisan gerrymandering. If
the original plan was struck down because of its large and durable partisan
asymmetry, it follows that any remedial map that remains severely and persistently asymmetric would be equally unlawful. Any such map would have
failed to “eliminate . . . all vestiges” of the underlying violation.239
On an intent-based theory of partisan gerrymandering, too, a court
would be unlikely to accept a reenacted plan that is about as skewed as its
antecedent. The mapmaking party might profess that its motives are now
pure, but its claim would hardly be believable if it would retain its advantage
under its proposed remedy. That an intent-focused approach can, in fact,
produce a substantial gain in partisan fairness is evident from the Florida
Georgia state house plan’s average efficiency gap was about half as large from 2004 to 2010 as
in 2002).
237
See supra notes 221–222 and accompanying text (discussing the increased durability of
contemporary gerrymanders).
238
See, e.g., Common Cause, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 690, vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018)
(mem.) (“[C]ourts generally do not afford a legislature a second ‘bite-at-the-apple’ to enact a
constitutionally compliant plan.”). Almost this sequence of events recently played out in Pennsylvania. After their original congressional plan was invalidated, Republican legislative leaders
proposed a remedial map that was nearly as skewed. Christopher Ingraham, Pennsylvania
Republicans Have Drawn a New Congressional Map That is Just as Gerrymandered as the Old
One, WASH. POST, (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/
02/11/pennsylvania-republicans-have-drawn-a-new-congressional-map-that-is-just-as-gerrymandered-as-the-old-one/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.53732ec7113f [https://perma.cc/
T6RW-B8RB]. See Pennsylvania U.S. House Plan Uploaded on 2/13/2018, PLANSCORE, http:/
/planscore.org/plan.html?PA-Joint-Submission-2018-02-JP [https://perma.cc/6WE4TRU2]. The Democratic governor, however, refused to sign this map into law, and the court
also declined to adopt it. See Katie Meyer, Wolf Administration Rejects GOP Congressional
Map Proposal [updated], WHYY (Feb. 13, 2018), https://whyy.org/segments/wolf-administration-rejects-gop-congressional-map-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/VVL2-HS4G]. Instead,
the court imposed its own remedy: a far more balanced map that actually cured the constitutional violation. See Christopher Ingraham, Pennsylvania Supreme Court draws ‘much more competitive’ district map to overturn Republican gerrymander, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/19/pennsylvania-supreme-court-draws-amuch-more-competitive-district-map-to-overturn-republican-gerrymander/?utm_term=.33c3
c3024a8e [https://perma.cc/JY9V-2DXA]; see also Pennsylvania U.S. House Plan Uploaded on
2/19/2018, PLANSCORE, http://www.planscore.org/plan.html?20180219T202039.59676116
0Z [https://perma.cc/2VZM-VQJ6].
239
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
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state court litigation. Florida Republicans were required to redraw eight congressional districts that were “tainted by unconstitutional intent.”240 The
Florida Supreme Court subsequently turned down “the Legislature’s proposed configuration” for these districts because it was “even more favorable
to the Republican Party than the enacted [plan].”241 Instead, the court approved the trial court’s alternative—and “objectively better”—arrangement.242 Under this scheme, the partisan tilt of Florida’s congressional map
shrank almost in half in the 2016 election, to its lowest level in more than
twenty years.243
As in life, then, there are no shortcuts in redistricting litigation. A repackaging response, in particular, is akin to a sugar high for a court that
selects this option. It gives the court the immediate gratification of invalidating an objectionable plan, but its benefits tend to dissipate quickly when the
jurisdiction designs a new map that is just as skewed but no longer vulnerable on nonpartisan grounds. A direct response, in contrast, is more like eating one’s vegetables. It’s unpleasant at the time (because of its greater risks of
confrontation with the elected branches), but in the long run it’s worth it
(because it promises actually to thwart partisan gerrymandering).
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